



















Asymptotic key generation rates
with phase-randomized coherent light by decoy method
Masahito Hayashi1, ∗
1ERATO-SORST Quantum Computation and Information Project, JST
5-28-3, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan
The asymptotic key generation (AKG) rates of quantum key distribution (QKD) with the decoy
method are discussed in both the forward error correction and the reverse error correction cases
when the QKD system is equipped with phase-randomized coherent light with arbitrary number of
intensities. For this purpose, we derive a useful convex expansion of the phase-randomized coherent
state. We also derive upper bounds of AKG rates on a natural and concrete channel model. Using
these upper bounds, we numerically check that the AKG rates are almost saturated when the number
of intensities is three.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk,03.67.-a,05.30.Jp
I. INTRODUCTION
The BB84 protocol proposed by Bennett and
Brassard[1] has been known as a famous protocol guaran-
teeing information theoretical in principle security. Its se-
curity has been proved by Mayers[2] in the single-photon
case. However, implemented channels usually have im-
perfect quantum state generators, which generate not a
perfect single-photon but a mixture of the vacuum state,
the single-photon state, and the multi-photon state. In
fact, many implemented quantum communication sys-
tems are equipped with phase-randomized weak coher-
ent light [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. In order to guarantee the se-
curity in the above imperfect quantum communication
systems, the decoy method has been proposed, in which
we randomly choose different intensities of the coher-
ent light[8, 9, 10, 11]. In these works, in order to ob-
tain the upper bound of the asymptotic key generation
(AKG) rate, one or two intensities have been consid-
ered, and the formula of the AKG rate, by Gottesman et
al. (GLLP)[12], Inamori et al. (ILM)[13], has been ap-
plied to the channel estimated from the detection rates
and the error rates of the individual intensities. After
GLLP-ILM’s result, Lo[14] conjectured an improvement
of their AKG rate. Based on his conjecture, Boileau-
Batuwantudawe-Laflamme (BBL)[15] discussed a further
improvement of the rate by taking into account the ef-
fects of dark counts in the detector. They pointed out
that the AKG rate in the forward error correction case
is different with respect to that in the reverse case. In
the following, these rates will be called BBL rates. Lo’s
conjecture has been proved by Hayashi [16] and Koashi
[17], independently. However, the actual value of the im-
proved AKG rate has not been calculated when phase-
randomized coherent light is transmitted. Further, even
applying GLLP-ILM formulas, the AKG rates are ob-
tained only when the total number of considered inten-
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sities is one or two. (If the vacuum state is counted as a
coherent state, this number is two or three.)
In this paper, we focus on the general case in which the
number k of intensities is arbitrary, and apply the BBL
rates to both the forward and reverse cases. Then, up-
per and lower bounds of AKG rates are calculated. For
this purpose, we derive a useful convex expansion of the
phase-randomized coherent state. This expansion allows
us to parameterize the channel using only 3k+3 parame-
ters. In the decoy method, we estimate these parameters
by mixing different kinds of pulses, namely, by changing
the intensity and the basis. Unfortunately, we cannot
uniquely decide these parameters from the error rates
and the detection rates of individual kinds of pulses. We
can estimate only the range of channel. Thus, our AKG
rates can be obtained as the worst BBL rates among the
rates of the channels in the estimated range.
For a further analysis of the AKG rates, we assume
that the channel models a natural noise, as it is usually
assumed for quantum communication channels. Under
this model, a larger number of intensities k gives a better
estimation of the channel. That is, a larger number k
yields better AKG rates. In this case, the BBL rates
with the true channel provide upper bounds for the AKG
rates. We also treat the intensity maximizing these upper
bounds. In particular, we numerically demonstrate that
these upper bounds are almost attained in the particular
data when k = 3. That is, the AKG rates are saturated
with k = 3. (If the vacuum state is counted as a coherent
state, they are saturated with four intensities.)
Unfortunately, the formulas obtained here cannot
guarantee the security of implemented quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) system because this paper treats only
the AKG rates. As it is discussed in Hayashi [16] and
Hayashi et al.[18], the guarantee of the security requires
complicated numerical calculations. Hence, it is impossi-
ble to analytically obtain the non-asymptotic key gener-
ation rate with a certain security. Thus, it is important
to roughly estimate the non-asymptotic key generation
rate based on the AKG rate in the initial stage of the
design of the whole implemented QKD system. The ana-
2lytical discussion of this paper is quite useful for such an
estimation. In particular, our optimization of intensity
contributes in optimizing such a design.
In previous papers[8, 9, 10, 11], the distinguishability
between the mixture of the bit basis of multi-photon and
that of the phase basis of multi-photon is not taken into
account. Both mixtures of the single-photon cannot be
distinguished, but they can be distinguished partially.
This paper treats the security by assuming that Eve can
distinguish them.
The organization of this paper is given as follows. Sec-
tion II gives the AKG rates in both the forward and re-
verse cases as conjectured by BBL[15], taking into ac-
count the effect of dark counts. In Section III, we derive





In Section IV, we give the upper and lower bounds of
AKG rate based on the detection rates and error rates of
respective intensities. In Section V, we discuss the case
when the number k of intensities goes to infinity. In Sec-
tion VI, we assume a natural noise model of quantum
communication channel as a standard model, and derive
upper bounds of AKG rates. In Section VII, we eval-
uate the difference between AKG rates and these upper
bounds, and numerically treat it in the case of k = 2, 3, 4.
Details of our proofs are given in Appendix. We also
give a generalization of mean value theorem (Theorem
7), which is explained in Appendix A.
II. GENERAL FORMULAS FOR AKG RATES
WITH DARK COUNTS EFFECT
When the transmitted pulse is given as a mixture of the
vacuum, single-photon, and multi-photon, taking into ac-
count the effect of dark counts in the detector, BBL[15]
conjectured the following AKG rate by use of Lo[14]’s
conjecture, which is proved by Koashi [17] and Hayashi
[16] independently. Let q0 and q1 be the probabilities de-
tecting the the vacuum state and the single-photon state
except for dark counts. We denote the dark count rate,
and the phase error probability concerning the single-
photon state detected except for dark counts, the bit er-
ror probability concerning the raw keys, and the detec-
tion rate of our pulse by pD, r
1, s, and pν , respectively.
When we use the phase-randomized coherent light with
the intensity µ, e−µ and µe−µ are the probabilities gen-
erating the vacuum state and the single-photon state. In
this case, Eve has no information concerning Bob’s bit of
the pulses detected by dark counts and Alice’s bit of the
pulses whose state is the vacuum state. Hence, the AKG
rate with the forward error correction is different from
that with the reverse error correction, and they are given












ν(1)q1(1 − h(r1)) + pD − pν(1 − η(s))
)
, (2)
where η(s) is the the coding rate of the classical error
correction code. These are the rates per one pulse sent
by Alice. Thus, the coefficient 12 corresponds to the prob-
ability that the basis of Alice coincides with that of Bob.
For protocols attaining these rates, see Hayashi [16].
In the above formulas, the parameters q0, q1 and r1
are not known a priori, and cannot be estimated if only
the pulse with the intensity µ is transmitted. In the
decoy method [8], we randomly change the intensity µ
and estimate these parameters from the detection rates
and error rates of individual intensities. In particular,
the parameter q0 can be estimated by the detection rate
of the vacuum pulses. However, it is more complicated
to estimate the other parameters q1 and r1. These are
calculated as simultaneous equations concerning the in-
dividual intensities, in which the detection rates and er-
ror rates of individual number states are treated as the
unknown parameters. That is, we have to treat infinite
number of unknown parameters. In order to avoid this





n! |n〉〈n|. In the latter section, we
estimate the parameters q1 and r1 based on this expan-
sion.





The phase-randomized coherent state∑∞
n=0
e−µµn
n! |n〉〈n| has the following convex expan-
sion.






































t=1 (µi − µt)
µ2n−1
∏n−2





Further the following conditions are equivalent:
1. µ1 < µ2 < · · · < µk.








Ωn is positive for
n = 2, . . . , i+ 1 and i = 2, . . . , k + 1.
3For examples, Ω2, Ω3, Ω4, Ω5 are calculated as
Ω2 =e
µ1 − 1− µ1,
Ω3 =e



















































µ24(µ4 − µ2)(µ4 − µ1)
µ23(µ3 − µ2)(µ3 − µ1)











µ24(µ4 − µ3)(µ4 − µ1)
µ22(µ3 − µ2)(µ2 − µ1)











µ24(µ4 − µ3)(µ4 − µ2)
µ21(µ3 − µ1)(µ2 − µ1)










In the following, in order to estimate the parameters
q1 and r1, we make simultaneous equations where the
unknown parameters are the detection rates qj (j =
1, 2, . . . , 2k+1) and the error rates rj (j = 1, 2, . . . , k+1)
of the × basis of the following states:
j = 0: The vacuum state
j = 1: The single-photon state
j = 2, . . . , k + 1: The state ρj with the × basis
j = k + 2, . . . , 2k + 1: The state ρj−k with the × basis
Note that qj is the rate of detection except for dark
counts. Since the average state of the state ρj with the
× basis is different from that the + basis, we have to
treat the parameter qj+k as a parameter different from
the parameter qj . Thus, it follows from Theorem 1 that
the generating probability of each state can be described
by the matrix (P jk:i)i=0,...,2k,j=0,...,2k+1 defined by
Pk :=

 1 0 0 0Y Z X 0
Y Z 0 X

 ,
where the k-dimensional vectors Y and Z and k× k ma-













e−µiΩj+1 if j = 1, . . . , i
0 if j = i+ 1, . . . , k
for i = 1, . . . , k.













1 0 0 0 0 0
e−µ1 µ1e
−µ1 Ω2e








−µ1 0 0 Ω2e
−µ1 0
e−µ2 µ2e










1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
e−µ1 µ1e
−µ1 Ω2e















−µ3 0 0 0
e−µ1 µ1e
−µ1 0 0 0 Ω2e
−µ1 0 0
e−µ2 µ2e

















4The probability p0 denotes the detection rate of the vac-
uum state, the probability pi(pi+k) does the detection
rate of the pulses of the ×(+) basis with the intensity
µi for i = 1, . . . , k, and the probability si does the er-
ror rate of the pulses of the × basis with the intensity
µi for i = 1, . . . , k. Then, the simultaneous equations
concerning the unknown parameters q0, . . . , q2k+1 and





j + pD, (4)














0 + pD), , (5)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, where r1
′
= (1 − pS)r
1 + pS(1 − r
1),
and pS is the probability that the error in the × basis
occurs at generation or detection in the single-photon
state. In addition, ri belongs to [0, 1] for i = 1, . . . , k, and
qi belongs to [0, 1− pD] for i = 0, . . . , 2k+1 because the
dark counts occur with the probability pD. Therefore,
we can estimate of the ranges of q1 and r1 from these
conditions.
Here, we should make a comment concerning pS . If
we take into account bit error probability among single-
photon states at generating the pulse, a tighter evalu-
ation of the asymptotic key generation (AKG) rate of
the forward case can be possible [19]. Similarly, if we
take into account bit error probability among single-
photon states at detection, a tighter evaluation of the
AKG rate of the reverse case is available [19]. However,
it is difficult to measure the error probabilities at gener-
ation and detection. Hence, we discuss the case where
these are unknown. In a case, the probability that er-
ror happens at generation or detection is known. We




1 + pS(1− r
1).
IV. ASYMPTOTIC KEY GENERATION (AKG)
RATES
In this section, we treat the AKG rates If and Ir based
on the conditions (4) and (5). Since the matrix P ji has
no inverse matrix, it is impossible to derive q1 and r1
from the conditions (4) and (5) uniquely. Since the AKG
rate is monotone increasing concerning q1(1 − h(r1)), it
is enough to calculate the minimum value I(~pk, ~sk) of
q1(1−h(r1)) for given vectors ~pk = (p1, . . . , pk) and ~sk =






Comparing the case of k kinds of intensities and the case
of k + 1 kinds of intensities, we obtain
I(~pk, ~sk) ≤ I(~pk+1, ~sk+1), (7)
where the first k components of ~pk+1 and ~sk+1 are equal
to ~pk and ~sk. Thus, the following theorem follows from
(6).








































1− pD ≥ q












1− pD ≥ q
0, . . . , q2k+1 ≥ 0
}















1− pD ≥ b

















1− pD ≥ b
1, . . . , bk+1 ≥ 0


for i = 0, . . . , k.
Thus, we can calculate the AKG rates of the phase-





P 1i+kI(~p,~s) + P
0





P 1i+kI(~p,~s) + pD − pi+k(1− eta(si+k))
)
in the forward and reverse cases, where η(si+k) is the cod-
ing rate of the classical error correction. Since pi+ksi+k ≥
1





, which implies h(si+k) ≥
pD
pi+k














Thus, the AKG rates in the forward and reverse cases is
at most 12 (P
1







is greater than 12 or q
1
min = 0. Note
that the condition x ≥ 12 is equivalent with the condition
x−pS
1−2pS
≥ 12 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.






5Theorem 3 The relations
q1min ≥ max{q1,min, . . . , qk,min} (8)
q1max ≤ min{q1,max, . . . , qk,max} (9)
b1min = max{b1,min, . . . , bk,min} (10)
b1max = min{b1,max, . . . , bk,max} (11)




max are calculated as
q1min = max{q1,min, . . . , qk,min} (12)
q1max = min{q1,max, . . . , qk,max}, (13)







2 − pD − e
−µi(p0 − pD)− (1− pD)Ωj+1e





2 − pD − e








2 − pD − e





2 − pD − e
−µi(p0 − pD)− (1− pD)Ωj+1e








2 (pD + e
−µi(p0 − pD)− (1− pD)Ωj+1e





2 (pD + e








2 (pD + e





2 (pD + e
−µi(p0 − pD)− (1− pD)Ωj+1e
−µjδi,j)) if j is even.
(17)
βji :=
µ1 · · ·µje
µi
µ2i (µj − µi) · · · (µi+1 − µi)(µi−1 − µi) · · · (µ1 − µi)
. (18)
The quantity Ωj+1e
−µj is a positive value for an odd j, and Ωj+1e
−µj is a negative value for an even j.










































































1− pD ≥ q












1− pD ≥ q
1+j , q1+j+k ≥ 0
}
.
Thus, the relations (12) and (13) hold.
V. ANALYSIS WITH MANY KINDS OF
INTENSITIES
When so many kinds of intensities µ1, . . . , µk can be
prepared, we can expect the convergence:
q1max − q
1
min → 0 (23)
b1max − b
1
min → 0 (24)
as k goes to infinity. In this case, since the two param-
eters q1 and b1 can be decided uniquely, it is possible to
evaluate Eve’s information tightly.
6In the following, we derive a necessary condition for
(23) and (24). If
βjjΩj+1e
−µj








1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)
→ 0, (25)
then the relations (23) and (24) follow from the discussion
in Section IV. For a further discussion, we obtain the
following theorem.
Theorem 4 When limj→∞
µj
j
< 1, the left hand side
























> − 12 , the LHS of (25) goes
to infinity.
Therefore, if we choose µj = j, the LHS of (25) goes to
infinity. Even though the LHS of (25) goes to infinity, the
LHS of (23) does not necessarily go to infinity. This is
because the relations q1max:k = qk,max and q
1
min:k = qk,min
do not always hold.
VI. UPPER BOUNDS ON CONCRETE NOISE
MODEL
We assume the following detection rate pi and the fol-
lowing error rate su with the intensity µi as a standard
model of quantum communication channel when p0 is the
detection rate of the vacuum pulse:
pi = pi+k = p(µi) := 1− e
−αµi + p0 (26)
si = si+k = s(µi)
:=




where α and s are additional parameters. In an im-
plemented channel, we expect the ranges of α, p0, and
pD around 0.01, 0.1α, and 0.05α. We assume that
0 < s < 0.5. Then, defining s′ = (1 − pS)s + pS(1 − s),
we obtain 0 < s′ < 0.5. For example, when the detection
probability of the n-photon state is 1 − (1 − α)n + p0,
the relation (26) holds. When the error probability of
the n-photon state is
s′(1−(1−α)n)+ 12p0
1−(1−α)n+p0
, the relation (27)




satisfy the condition of the defition
(6). Thus, we obtain











≤(α+ (p0 − pD))(1 − h(
sα+ 12 (p0 − pD)
α+ (p0 − pD)
)),
where ~pk(~µk) = (p(µ1), . . . , p(µk)), ~sk(~µk) =
(s(µ1), . . . , s(µk)). Therefore, applying (1) and (2),
we obtain the following upper bounds of the AKG rates
in the forward and reverse cases:





µe−µ(α+ (p0 − pD))(1 − h(
sα+ 12 (p0 − pD)
α+ (p0 − pD)
))
+ e−µp0 − (1− e
−αµ + p0)h(
s′(1− e−αµ) + 12p0









µe−µ(α+ (p0 − pD))(1 − h(
sα+ 12 (p0 − pD)
α+ (p0 − pD)
))
+ pD − (1 − e
−αµ + p0)h(
s′(1− e−αµ) + 12p0









, the rates are given as functions
of s˜ as follows:







)) + e−µp0 − (1− e
−αµ + p0)h(s˜)
2











We obtain the following lemma. Lemma 1 The inequalities
argmax
µ
I→(µ; p0, pD, pS , s) ≤ 1 (30)
argmax
µ
I←(µ; p0, pD, pS , s) ≤ 1 (31)

















FIG. 1: The optimum AKG rate with pD = p0 = pS = 0 and
α = 0.01. This displays the graphs of (34) and (34). These
are too close to distinguish.
hold.
Hence, it is suitable to choose the intensity of the phase-
randomized coherent light producing the raw keys among
the interval [0, 1]. If we choose {µi}
k
i=1 satisfying the













(p0 − pD), (33)
i.e., the rates (28) and (29) can be attained by a suffi-
ciently large number k.
When p0 = pD = pS = 0, both rates are equal to
1
2
(µe−µα(1 − h(s))− (1− e−αµ)h(s)),
which can be approximated by
1
2
(µe−µα(1 − h(s))− (1− e−αµ)h(s))
∼=α
µ(e−µ − (1 + e−µ)h(s))
2
(34)
when α is sufficiently small. The graphs of maxµ µ(e
−µ−
(1+ e−µ)h(s)) and argmaxµ µ(e
−µ− (1+ e−µ)h(s)) with
α = 0.01 are given in FIG1. These two graphs are too
close to distinguish in FIG1. FIG2 gives the optimal
intensity for key generation. On the other hand, FIGs
3 and 4 give the optimum rates and intensities based on
(34) and (34) when pS = 0, pD = 0.0004, p0 − pD =
0.0008, and α = 0.01.
However, this discussion requires the infinite number
of intensities for estimating q1 and b1. In an implemented
system, we have to estimate q1 and b1 based on a finite
number of intensities µ1, . . . , µk. It is an important ques-
tion from a practical viewpoint how many numbers of in-
tensities µ1, . . . , µk are sufficient for obtaining estimated
values q1 and b1 close to α+p0−pD and sα+
1
2 (p0−pD).













FIG. 2: The optimum intensities with pD = p0 = pS = 0
and α = 0.01. This displays the graphs using (34) and (34).
These are too close to distinguish.
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FIG. 3: The optimum AKG rates with pS = 0, pD = 0.0004,
p0 = 0.0008, α = 0.01. The solid line is the forward case. The
dotted line is the reverse case.
As is demonstrated later, the values q1 and b1 are suffi-
ciently close to α + p0 − pD and sα +
1
2 (p0 − pD) when
k = 3. In the case of k = 1 or k = 2, these are cannot be
used as approximations of q1 and b1. That is, it is suit-
able that three kinds of intensities are used in the decoy
method.
VII. APPROXIMATIONS OF AKG RATES IN
STANDARD NOISE MODEL
A. Characterizations of errors of approximations
In this section, we discuss how close AKG rates are to
the upper bounds (28) and (29) for a given number k, i.e.,
whether (28) and (29) can be used for approximations of
AKG rates. Using the relations (26) and (27), we can
calculate qj,min, qj,max, bj,min, and bj,max as follows.
80.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03














FIG. 4: The optimum intensity µ with pS = 0, pD = 0.0004,
p0 = 0.0008, α = 0.01. The solid line is the forward case. The
dotted line is the reverse case.
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FIG. 5: The relation between the error probability of detected
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−µj if j is odd.∑j
i=1 β
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−µi) if j is odd.∑j
i=1 β
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−µj if j is even.
When {µi}
k
i=1 satisfies the necessary condition given
in Theorem 4, the relations (32), (33), and (25) hold.
Assume that p0 − pD = 0. Then, from the relations








ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj) = 0. (35)
9From the relations (35) and (25), we obtain the approx-
imations:
ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj)
∼= 0 (36)
βjjΩj+1e
−µj ∼= 0. (37)
for a sufficiently large number j, i.e.,
qj,min ∼= qj,max ∼= α+ (p0 − pD) (38)














(p0 − pD) (41)
hold for k ≥ j. That is, the upper bounds (28) and (29)
can be approximately attained. In this approximation,
we used two approximations (36) and (37), which are
evaluated as follows.
Theorem 5 We denote the j− 1-dimensional simplex and its uniform probability measure by ∆j−1 and pj−1, respec-
tively. Then, ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj) is characterized as follows.
ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj)
=(−1)j−1












npj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj . (42)
In the case of α = 1, the relation
βjjΩj+1e
−µj = ǫj1(µ1, . . . , µj) (43)
holds. Hence, |ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj)| is monotone increasing concerning all of µ1, . . . , µj, and α.
Since the approximations (40) and (41) are obtained by two approximations (36) and (37), from (43) qj,min, qj,max,
rj,min, and rj,max are rewritten as
qj,min =
{
α+ (p0 − pD) + ǫ
j
α(µ1, . . . , µj)− (1− p0)ǫ
j
1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is odd.
α+ (p0 − pD) + ǫ
j
α(µ1, . . . , µj) + (p0 − pD)ǫ
j
1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is even.
qj,max =
{
α+ (p0 − pD) + ǫ
j
α(µ1, . . . , µj) + (p0 − pD)ǫ
j
1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is odd.
α+ (p0 − pD) + ǫ
j
α(µ1, . . . , µj)− (1− p0)ǫ
j
1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is even.
bj,min =
{
s′α+ 12 (p0 − pD) + s
′ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj)− (1−
1
2 (p0 + pD))ǫ
j
1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is odd.
s′α+ 12 (p0 − pD) + s




1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is even.
bj,max =
{
s′α+ 12 (p0 − pD) + s




1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is odd.
s′α+ 12 (p0 − pD) + s
′ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj)− (1−
1
2 (p0 + pD))ǫ
j
1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is even.
B. Approximations of errors of approximations
In this subsection, we approximate errors of ap-
proximations (40) and (41) based on a suitable as-
sumption for µ1, . . . , µk. One intensity µi is cho-
sen as a intensity whose pulse generates raw keys.
It is suitable to choose argmaxµ I→(µ; p0, pD, pS , s) or
argmaxµ I←(µ; p0, pD, pS , s) for this intensity. Also the
remaining intensities had better be chosen so that
ǫkα(µ1, . . . , µk) or ǫ
k
1(µ1, . . . , µk) is sufficiently small. Re-
member that these are monotone increasing concern-
ing µ1, . . . , µk. Thus, the following design is suit-
able: The maximum intensity µk is chosen as the
intensity whose pulse generates the raw keys. This
intensity is equal to argmaxµ I→(µ; p0, pD, pS , s) or
argmaxµ I←(µ; p0, pD, pS , s). The remaining intensities
µ1, . . . , µk−1 are chosen as small as possible. However, if
we choose all of them to be 0, the variances of the de-
tection rates go to infinity in the case of the finite-length
code. In this case, (42) implies that ǫkα(µ1, . . . µk) is equal
to 0.
Therefore, it is needed to describe the behavior of









|ǫkα(µ1, . . . µk)|

























µ1, . . . , µk−1 and α are small enough, |ǫ
k
α(µ1, . . . µk)| can
be approximated as
|ǫkα(µ1, . . . µk)|




When α is 1 and µ1, . . . , µk−1 are small enough, the re-
lation (44) implies
|ǫk1(µ1, . . . µk)|




Theorem 6 When the relations
µie




α+ (p0 − pD)
(49)
hold as well as (46) and (47), q1min:k and q
1
max:k are evaluated approximately as
q1min:k














} if k is odd.




if k is even.
(50)
q1max:k








if k is odd.










} if k is even.
(51)














if k = 1








} if k is odd, not 1.




if k is even.
(52)
q1max:k








if k is odd








} if k is even.
(53)
b1min:k







if k = 1












} if k is odd, not 1.








) if k is even.
(54)
b1max:k












) if k is odd.


















and τ := s′α+ 12 (p0 − pD).
In the case of i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the condition in (48) is given as follows.
µ1 ≤ 0.567, µ2 ≤ 0.852, µ3 ≤ 1.050, µ4 ≤ 1.202.
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C. Approximations of AKG rates in the case of
k = 2, 3, 4
Now, we evaluate the error of approximations based on
Theorem 6. In order to treat how close q1min:k and q
1
max:k














and b1max:k = (1 + θ
′
+)(s
′α + 12 (p0 − pD)). Then, in the
cases of k = 2, 3, 4, when the conditions of Theorem 6
are satisfied, θ− and θ+ are approximately calculated as


























































































In the above we give numerical values in the case of µj =
0.1j for j = 1, . . . , k − 1, p0 = 0.0008, pD = 0.0004,
α = 0.01, s = s′ = 0.02, µk = 0.5, which implies that
pS = 0, λ =
1














calculated to 1−0.030−2.8×0.047 = 1−0.16 in the case
of k = 2, and 1−0.011−2.8×0.012 = 1−0.044 in the case
of k = 3, and 1− 0.00014− 2.8× 0.00078 = 1− 0.0023 in
the case of k = 4. In order to attain the optimum I(~p,~s)
within 5% error, we need 3 kinds of intensities. Maybe,
the same conclusion holds around these parameters.
D. Examination of approximations (46) and (47)
In the following, we numerically check the approxi-
mations (46) and (47) in the case of α = 0.01. In or-
der to treat (46), FIG6 gives the graphs of
|ǫjα(µ1,...µj)|
α





in the case of j = 2, 3, 4 and
µi = 0.1i(i < j). For the check of (47), FIG7 presents
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case of j = 2, 3, 4 and µi = 0.1i(i < j). These graphs
indicate that the approximations (46) and (47) have a
good quality.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the AKG rates with phase-
randomized coherent light by the decoy method, in which
12
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, The solid line:
|ǫj1(µ1, . . . µj)|.
the muber k of possible intensities is arbitrary. For this
purpose, we have derived a useful convex expansion of
the phase-randomized coherent state, which allows us to
parameterize Eve’s operation using 3k + 3 parameters.
Thanks to this parametrization, upper and lower bounds
of AKG rates have been obtained. Also, assuming that
the noise in the quantum channel is described by a nat-
ural model, we have derived upper bounds independent
of the number k of intensities. It has been numerically
demonstrated that these upper bounds can be used as
they are good approximations when k ≥ 3, i.e., the AKG
rates cannot be improved so much even if we prepare a
number of intensities k larger than 3.
Further, we have discussed the intensity maximiz-
ing our upper bound of the AKG rate. It has been
shown that this optimum intensity is always less than
1. We have also characterized the relationship between
the AKG rate and intensities that do not generate raw
keys. These results indicate how to choose intensities
in an implemented quantum key distribution system, in
which the decoy method is applied.
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APPENDIX A: EXTENSTION OF MEAN VALUE
THEOREM
Theorem 7 Any n-differentiable function f on R and











1≤j≤n+1,j 6=i(xi − xj)
, (A1)
where ∆n is n-th simplex, pn is the standard uniform
probability measure on ∆n. Hence, there exists a point
z ∈ [x1, xn+1] such that




1≤j≤n+1,j 6=i(xi − xj)
.
Proof: We will prove (A1) by induction. The case of
n = 1 is trivial. By the assumption of induction, we
































































2≤j≤n,j 6=i(xi − xj)
xn+1 − x1
























1≤j≤n+1,j 6=i(xi − xj)
.




(i = 2, . . . , n). Then,













bbixi + (1− b)xn+1)db b









bbixi + (1 − b)x1)db b














bbixi + (1 − b)x1)
)
db bn−2pn−2(b2 . . . bn)db2 . . . dbn










bbixi + (1 − b)(xn+1 − x1)s+ (1 − b)x1)ds










cixi)pn(b1 . . . bn+1)dc1 . . . dcn+1 (A4)
In equation (A4), we introduce parameters c1 = (1 −
b)(1− s) ci = bbi (i = 2, . . . , n), cn+1 = (1− b)s, and use

















Therefore, we obtain (A1).
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 1









































































Now, we prove (B1) by induction. In fact, it is trivial in



























































































































































































For this purpose, we apply Theorem 7 to the



















































Next, we prove the equivalence between the positivity
of γl,n for i = 2, . . . , k + 1, n ≥ 2 and the condition
µk > · · · > µ1. Substituting l − 2 and x
n−2 into n and




































n−lpl−2(a1, . . . , al−1)da1 . . . dal−1 > 0,
the positivity of γl,n for i = 2, . . . , k+1 and n ≥ 2 is equivalent with the positivity of
∏l−2
k=1(µl−1−µk) for l = 3, . . . , k+1.
Thus, we obtain the equivalence between the positivity of ρi and the condition µk > · · · > µ1. Further, the condition







Ωn is positive for n = 2, . . . , i+1 and i = 2, . . . , k+1. Thus, we obtain
the desired equivalence.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
When qj,min, qj,max, bj,min, bj,max are defined by (19),
(20), (21), (22), we obtain (8), (9), (10), (11). Hence,
we prove (14), (15), (16), (17) by defining qj,min, qj,max,
bj,min, bj,max in (19), (20), (21), (22).
We will prove (14) and (15). From the condition in
(19), we have
pi − pD − e





Using the symmetry of P , we have
pσ(i) − pD − e








i+ k if i ≤ k




1 if j = 1
i+ k if 1 < j ≤ k + 1




− pD − e













−µi if t = 1
µ2i (µi−µ1)···(µi−µt−2)
µ2t−1(µt−1−µ1)···(µt−1−µt−2)
e−µiΩt if 2 ≤ t ≤ i+ 1

















for i = 1, . . . , k. When we focus on j elements, we have
pi+k + pi
2




































Note that βjj is positive when j is odd and β
j
j is negative
when j is even. Since 0 ≤ q
j+1+q2j+1
2 ≤ 1−pD, we obtain
(14) and (15). Similarly, we can prove (16) and (17).





1 if t = 1
µi(µi − µ1) · · · (µi − µt−2) if 2 ≤ t ≤ i+ 1






−µ1 0 · · · 0
0 µ2e











1 0 · · · 0
0 Ω2
µ21


















1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)
,
which is equivalent with two equations:






1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)
= 1
(C2)








1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)
= 0.
(C3)
First, we prove (C3). The relation








1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)




t−1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)
holds. Applying Theorem 7 in the case of n =




= 0, which implies (C3).
Next, we prove (C2) by induction. This equation is
trivial in the case of j = 1. From the assumption of
17
induction, we have






1≤k≤j−1,k 6=i(µi − µk)
= 1
















1≤k≤j−1,k 6=i(µi − µk)






2≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)









2≤k≤j−1,k 6=i(µi − µk)




1≤k≤j−1,k 6=1(µ1 − µk)




2≤k≤j,k 6=j(µj − µk)






1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)




1≤k≤j,k 6=1(µ1 − µk)




1≤k≤j,k 6=j(µj − µk)
=(µj − µ1)(−1)






1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)
.
Thus, we obtain (C2).
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
It is sufficient to show
dI→(µ; p0, pD, pS , s)
dµ
|µ=1 ≤ 0 (D1)
dI←(µ; p0, pD, pS , s)
dµ
|µ=1 ≤ 0. (D2)
From the assumption, the parameter s′ also satisfies
0 ≤ s′ ≤ 1/2. Hence, h(
s′(1−e−αµ)+ 12p0
1−e−αµ+p0
) is monotone in-















(1 − µ)e−µ(α+ (p0 − pD))(1 − h(
sα+ 12 (p0 − pD)
α+ (p0 − pD)
))








s′(1 − e−αµ) + 12p0










(1 − µ)e−µ(α+ (p0 − pD))(1 − h(
sα+ 12 (p0 − pD)
α+ (p0 − pD)
))







s′(1 − e−αµ) + 12p0




we can check (D1) and (D2).
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1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)
∣∣∣∣∣∣













n−1−jpj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj
=












n−1−jpj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj
=












npj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj (E1)
≤














npj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj
=






i=1 aiµipj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj .
Assume that lim supj→∞
µj
j
= c0 < 1. Choose c1 such






i=1 aiµipj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj ≤ e

































j ≤ ec0 . Since
(ec0)jeµj → 0,
we obtain (E2).












npj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj
≥












npj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj
≥









































= c0 > 1. Then,
µ1···µj













→∞. Thus, combining (E1), we have
































∼= j+12 . Thus,








































2 →∞. Therefore, combining (E1) and
(E3), we obtain (E4).
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1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)






1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)
.
As is proven as (C2) in Appendix C, the relation






1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)
= 1















1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)
=(−1)j−1












npj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj .
Thus, we obtain (42).




n! . Then, we have
(−1)j−1












npj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj












APPENDIX G: PROOF OF (44)
The equation (44) can be proved by the following calculation:
lim
µ1,...,µk−1→0
|ǫkα(µ1, . . . µk)|









(n+ j + 1)(n+ j)n!
(ajµj)









(n+ j + 1)(n+ j)n!
(ajµj)





1− (1 − α)n+j+1










1− (1 − α)n+j+1















APPENDIX H: PROOF OF THEOREM 6
When j is odd, by using (46) and (47), qj,min can be
approximated as
qj,min ∼=α+ (p0 − pD)































α+ (p0 − pD)
& 1− µ1 · · ·µj−1
1− α− p0





When j is even, by using (46) and (47), qj,min can be
approximated as
qj,min ∼=α+ (p0 − pD)
− µ1 · · ·µj−1(
αf j−1(µj)
µj−1j




Note that ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj) is negative when j is even. Using
(H1), we obtain
qj,min
α+ (p0 − pD)




As shown later, the condition (48) implies
µ1 · · ·µj−1
f j−1(µj)
µj−1j




µ1 · · ·µj−1
f j(µj)
µjj




When k is odd,
max
j:even,j≤k
1− µ1 · · ·µj−1
f j−1(µj)
µj−1j





1− µ1 · · ·µj−1
1− α− p0
α+ (p0 − pD)
f j(µj)
µjj
=1− µ1 · · ·µk−1
1− α− p0





α+ (p0 − pD)
&1− µ1 · · ·µk−1min{
1− α− p0








When k is even,
max
j:even,j≤k
1− µ1 · · ·µj−1
f j−1(µj)
µj−1j





1− µ1 · · ·µj−1
1− α− p0
α+ (p0 − pD)
f j(µj)
µjj
=1− µ1 · · ·µk−1
1− α− p0















α+ (p0 − pD)




Thus, we obtain (50).
Further, when α is small enough relatively to 1, and
p0 − pD is small enough relatively to α, qj,min can be
approximated as
qj,min









if j is odd.





if j is even.
Hence, from (H4), (H5) and (H6), we obtain (52). Simi-
larly, we can derive (54). Note that λ cannot be ignored
in this case.
Similarly to (H2) and (H3), we can show that
qj,max









if j is odd.







if j is even.
Combining (H4), (H5) and (H6), we obtain (51). Using
the same discussion as (52). we obtain (53) and (55).
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